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Strange s it inay seein, this important theme appears never to have been treated fully, though the literature of Greek philosophy, ancient and modern, abounds in definite references or vague allusions to it. The Greek terms applied to such change are the nouns άλλοίωσις or έτεροίωσις and their cognates. The latter, though occurring only once in Aristotle, 1 ) is probably the older terin. In general, άλλοι'ωαις is the word that Stands for a definite conception; and hence in the following discussion it will be used alone, though the two nouns are essentially synonymous.
Broadly speaking, άλλοίωσις signifies change; more specifically, change of aspect or quality. In itself it predicates notbing of the mode or process by which a given object, of whatever description, ceases to have one character and takes on another. Oftentimes the writer who ernploys the term manifestly has no clear and clistinct idea to express; and it is not impossible that certain of the earliest philosophers had given the subject no thought. But Phys. 217 b 26. The word occurs s early s Melissus. The verb Stands in Heraclitus, fr. 67 (Diels), but I incline to think it due to a later redaetion, such s appears not unfrequently in Heraclitus. Zeller would have us think that it Stands in a verbatim citation of Anaxagoras by Aristotle Gen. et Corr. 314 a 15. But see n. 110, below. Heraclitus uses μεταβάλλειν and μεταττί-ειν. The latter verb occurs also in Melissus. The verb άλλοιουται occurs in [Hippocr.] de Victu (see n. 79), but the date of this tractate is too uncertain to yield satisfactory evidence.
it is evident that in general άλλοίωσις is employed by the later Greek writers on philosophy io the sense which it bears in Aristotle's works.
Plato, whose free coinage of philosophical terminology is well knowD, was apparently the first to use the word in a signification delinite enough to ontitle one to speak of it s a technical term. At all events, the manner in which he introduces the distinction between φορά and άλλοίωσις suggests a consdous Innovation.
2 ) But even he does not define the mode of eifecting this kind of change, except in so far s the object is said to remain in the same place -which is indeed the point of distinction s against φορά -and elsewhere he employs the term with a certain indefiniteness, except when he refers to change of character by recomposition.
3 )
Aristotle, likewise, at times speaks rather vaguely of άλλοίωσις, s if it could denote any qualitative change whatsoever; generally, however, the word bears a well-defmed nieaning. He says that it is found whenever, -the sensible Substrate remaining the same^ -the substance changes in respect of its qualities^ which are either 2 ) Theaet. 181 B foll., speaking of the flowing philosophers, he suggests that their "dictuin πάνταρεΐ embr ces not only motion of translation (φορά) but also άλλοίωσις -όταν YJ μεν εν τψ αύτιίϊ, γηρασκη δε, ή μέλαν εκ λευκού ή σκληρόν εκ μαλακοϋ γιγνηται, ή τίνα ά'λλην άλλοίωσιν άλλοιώταί. Cp. Parm. 138 Β foll. δτι κινούμενον γε vj φέροιτο ή ολλοιοΐτο αν αύται γαρ μόναι κινήσεις. The passage relates αλλοίωσις to ποιεΐν and πάσχειν, and the tone is more dogmatic. Theaet. 157 B and Farm. 162 B -164 B άλλοίωσις is used (in quasi-Heraclitic terins) s equivalent to θάνατος; ep. also Legg. 894 E. How Plato would have us think of άλλοίωσις in Heraclitus is.clearly indicated Theaet. 152 ί) foll. See below, n. 15.
)
Repub. 380 E -381 D Plato uses the term of changes of form s well s of character. There is latent, however, the same reference· to the Eleatic :protest against multiplieity, implied in all change, s in Parm. 138 B foll. Repub. 45)4 G άλλοίωσις is indefinite, merely-opposed to δμοίωσις. Tim. 45 D, after appropriating Empedocles's theory of Tision, s based on the interaction of like and like, Plato explains the failure of sight by night s due to άλλοίωσις of the fire emitted by the eye, caused by the unlikeness to it of the air devoid of fire. Tim. 82 B άλλοιοτητες are changes in character due to recomposition of the four (Empedoclean) elements. Grat. 418 A refers to change f meaning in word. Phaedo 78 D άλλοίωσις is opposed to that which has only ne character (μονοειδές). Cp. Legg. 648 E, where deterioration is implied, s in Repub. 380 E foll. contrary or neutral. 4 ) He thus distinguishes άλλοίωσις fr,om such changes s are effected by transformation, by addition, by subtraction, or by composition. 5 ) This Statement would seem to be sufficiently explicit. Never theless many difficulties arise when one inquires just what changes shall be regarded s involving άλλοίωαις. Thus one is not a little surprised to find that Aristotle so considered the process of rarefaction and condensation, 6 ) whereas we are accustomed to regard it s a purely quantitative change, the alteration being such s a given mass undergoes in occupying more or less space. ) Gen. et Corr. 319k 10 άλλοίωσις μεν εστίν, όταν υπομένοντος του υπο-κειμένου, αισθητού οντος, μεταβάλλη εν τοις αυτού παθεσιν, η έναντίοις ούσιν ή μεταξύ.
) Phys. 190 *> δ γι'γνεται δε τα γιγνόμενα απλώς τα μεν μετασχηματίσει, οΓον άνδριάς εκ χαλκού, τα δε προσθέσει, οΓον τα αυξανόμενα, τα δ* αφαιρέσει, οίον εκ του λίθου δ Έρμης, τα δε συνθέσει, οΓον οικία, τα δ"* αλλοιώσει, οΓον τα τρεπό-μενα κατά την υλην. Thus άλλοίωσις is allotropy, to use a modern chetnical term. 6 ) This is evident from many passages. One will suffice: Phys. 246 a 6 άλλα γίνεσθαι μεν ίσως εκαστον άναγκαϊον άλλοιουμένου τινός, οΓον της ύλης πυκνουμένης ή μανουμένης ή θερμαινόμενης ή ψυχομένης. The kinds of change are significant; for \vith Anaximenes, and the early Greek thinkers generally, rarefying and warming, condensing and cooling, are synonymous. That the process was called "rarefaction and condensation' rather than 'warming and eooli g' shows what aspects of the phenomena most impressed these pbilosophers. With Aristotle the emphasis was clearly reversed.
7
) This point of view was indeed quite famili r to Aristotle himself, s Categ. 10 a 16 και κατά την μορφήν δε εκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται, το δε μανόν και το TTJXVOV και το τραχύ και το λεϊον δόςειε μεν αν ποιόν τι σημαίνειν, εοικε Οέ αλλότρια τα τοιαύτα είναι της περί το ποιόν διαιρέσεως· θέσιν γαρ μάλλον τίνα φαίνεται των μορίων έκατερον δηλουν. πυκνόν μεν γαρ τφ τα μόρια σύνεγγυς είναι άλλήλοις, μανόν δε τφ διεσταναι απ αλλήλων. De Caelo. 299h 7 έτι ει το μεν βαρύ πυκνόν τι, το δε κουφόν μανόν, εστί δε πυκνόν μανού διαφέρον τψ εν ί'σφ ογκω πλεΐον ένυπα'ρχειν. The Opposition of δόξειε and εοικε in the first passage may be significant, if the former verb, s is frequently the case, alludes to traditional views, while the latter ^ expresses Aristotle's own opinion. It would then appear that Aristotle believed he was reflecting the opinions of predecessors (see n. 6), in making the distinction between the rare and the dense qualitative, whereas he himself held it to be quantitative. I hope to make it probable tbat the φυσικοί shared Aristotles own view, and that tbeir doctrine was misunderstood.
In anothcr passage 8 ) hc speaks of this process s tbe source of all qualities that are subject to άλλ<κω3ΐς. Agaio, we are inforraed that increase 9 ) necessarily invol\ f cs άλλοίωσκ, and the same \vould seem to be true of freezing and of crystallization in general, which \ve should regard s changes in form or structure.
10 ) The 8 ) Pfy*. 260& 7 έτι δε πάντων των -αγημάτων (= παθών, cp. Met. 1022& 15 foll.) αρχή πόκνωσις και μάνωσις· xcc! γαρ βαρύ και κουφον ν.αΐ μαλακόν καΐ σκληρόν και θερμόν και ψυχρόν πυκνότητες δοκούσιν και όραιότητες είναι τίνες, τιύκνωσις δε κα\ μανωσις σύγκρισις και διάκρισις, καίΡ 3ς γένεσις και φ8ορά λέγεται των ουσιών. Here once more δoκoi5σιv and λέγεται indicate that Aristotle believes he is reflecting the philosophical tradition. The passage is interesting also for other reasons. It appears to state discursively what the early physiologers perceived naively, viewing the process s the natural sequel of the κίνησις άίδιος; for Aristotle is trying to prove that motion of translation is the original form of change, and that the original form of φορά is the circular, beca se ( s returning upon itself) it is continuous. The ideas are ancierit; cp. Alcmaeon's explanation of man's mortality Arist. Pro6l. 916 a 33, and Heraclitus, fr. 103 with Diels's note on Parinenides 3, l in Parmenides Lehrgedicht, p. 66 foll. In our passage Aristotle had in mind the notion of a δίνη almost universally held by the early philosophers.
9
) Phys. 260 a 29 αδύνατον γαρ αυςησιν είναι αλλοιώσεως μη προϋπαρχούσης· το γαρ αύξανόμενον εστί μεν ως δμοίψ αυξάνεται, εστί δ* ως άνομοίφ. τροφή γαρ λέγεται τψ έναντίψ το εναντίον, προσγίνεται δε παν γινόμενον δμοιον δμοίφ ανάγκη ούν άλλοίωσιν είναι την είς τάναντίά μεταβολήν. Ι do not know whose opinion (cp. λέγεται) Aristotle here thinbs to reproduce: but it is his famili r doctrine of nutrition by c assimilation'. We here meet for the first tirne Aristotle's deeprooted preconception, expressed in the last clause, that wherever there is a change from one state to its contrary, there is αλλοίωσις. We shall find hereafter how this assumption vitiated the account of sense -perception in their predecessors s given by Aristotle and Theophrastus. The play of contraries in άλλοίωσις is recognized in the definition, abpve, n. 4.
10
) Prantl, Aristoteles Acht B cher Physik, Leipzig, 1854, p. 519, speaking of Phys. 246 a l foll. says: "Es ist merkw rdig, wie hier und in dem Folgenden wieder blo sprachlich-grammatisch argumentirt ist, so da der ganze Erfolg "des Beweises eigentlich nur eine Rectificirung des Sprachgebrauches ist, abgesehen davon, da hier selbst inhaltlich das Bedenken bleibt, da die Formirung und Gestaltung nur vom menschlich-k nstlerischen Bilden gilt, denn die nach Arist. doch gewi qualitative Aenderung des Gefrierens und Krystallisirens in den Naturgebilden bringt eine von ihr untrennbare Modifikation der Gestaltung mit sich; wo h rt dann die (ίλλοίωσις auf?" PrantPs perplexed and somewhat impatient question will, I am sure, be echoed by every Student of the problem. The difficulty, s regards Aristotle, is enhanced by the fact that he often speaks from what he assumes to be the point of fact that άλλοι'ωσις, s conceived by Aristotle, thus manifestly involves notions which are not coincident with modern conceptions of qualitative change, makes it imperative to examine the records of the pre-Socratics, to determine just what they inay have had in mind in speaking of such alterations s \ve call qualitative!. For we surely have no right to assume that they approached the problem with the same presuppositions s we of modern times.
In the ancient accounts there appear two -modes of conceiving what takes place when an object alters its character. One of these is technically known s άλλοίωσις; the other is called μίςις or xpacrtc.
11
) Of the first of these modes we have already spoken; but we need to consider it niore narrowly, in order to discover whether its implications are such s to fit into pre-Socratic thought.
The term άλλοίωσις, in the Aristotelian sense, implies a hard and fast definition of identity and difference, with the identity residing in an unchanging essence, while the difterentiae relate to the nonessential or accidental. Of these two pairs of ideas, the first -viz. identity and difference -received a distinct formulation only in. consequence of the Eleatic dialectic; the second pair -viz. essence and accident, or substance and attribute -is a product of logic, s it was developed by Plato and Aristotle on the foundations laid by Socrates in his quest for general and universally valid definitions.
12 ) That a conception of such complexity cannot be reasonably sought among the pre-Socratics need hardly be proven by further arguments.
view of his predecessors, whereas he is in many cases unconscioiisly itnporting bis own conceptions into spheres' quite alien to them. Some of these cases can he proven beyond a peradventure, namely in regard to the so-called minute philosophers; in other cases the proof is necessarily soroewhat less exact 1J ) The pre-Socratics do not appear to bave distinguished between these terms s did Aristotle and the Stoics in later times.
12
) See Arist. Met. 1078h 17 folL The definitions of Democritus and the Pythagoreans were not based on this procedure. Indeed, all the definitions of coiicrete things known to us from the pre-Socratics have regard, like those of Eiopedocles, to the composition of the substance: in other words, their definitions are chemical formulas.
Hut it may bc objected that this conclusion proves nothing, s Anstelle in this iustauce, s in so many others, is only defining with undue precision a conception vvhich in the minds of bis predccessors was rather indefinite. The objection deserves consideration: but the real question is whether the mode of change, however vaguely conceived by the early philosophers, was actually in essential pointe like that which Aristotle called άλλοίωσις. The difficulty -I had almost said the impossibility -of conceiving such a process, except on the basis of the presuppositions above detailed, is such that I believe no one who squarely faces the question will answer it in the affirmative. This alternative once rejected, we must look to the mode known s μίςις, unless, indeed, we are to suppose that the early Greeks may have had in mind nothing more definite than the mysterious c sea-changes', to \vhich their marine divinities were in the mythology thought to be subject, or those equally miraculous transformations of the prodigies, such s the conversion of a cock into a hen. Only an utter want of evidence tending to establish a more rational view eould justify one, it would seem, in having recourse to so unphilosophical and, for the Greek philosophers, so unlikely a conclusion.
Turning now to the rival conception -that of μιξις -, we may say that the term denotes all forms of composition, decomposition, and recomposition. There is, to be sure, a sense in which μίξις implies the existence of elements unitary, homogeneous and eternal, s the possible ingredients of composition. If this was the only sense in which the term could be fitly employed, they might be in the right who hold that this mode of change is not to be found before Empedocles and Anaxagoras; 13 ) for, in.that case, the notion would involve the same definite view of unity (identity) and difference which'we have seen to .be neccessarily involved in the conception of άλλοίωσις. And this definition was the otitcome of the Eleatic dialectic concerning the One. It would be s unreasonable to seek such a view among the loniaus s s it would be to expect 13 ) Parmenides (fr. 8, 54 foll. and fr. 9) represents bis elements (Light and Night) in the same terms s Empedocles his Love and Strife (fr, 17, 20) and his four elements (fr. 17,27) .
. .
to find there Aristotle's own μίξις, regarded s chemical combination involving άλλοίωσις. 34 ) But, fortunately, these are not the only presuppositions on which μίξις is possible. Indeed, the passages in which ch nge of quality is attributed to μίξις are almost s numerous s those in which it is explained bj αλλοιώσεις, The practice of altering the character of a thing by admixture of something eise is so simple and so primitive that there is no difficulty aboiit assuming it for any period of human history above that of the veriest br te savagery. No assumption s to ultimate eleinental characters need be made: any pronounced character, even though it be itself the product of a previous mixture, will serve the ends of such composition.
It is in this sense that Plato represents S.ocrates s maintaining that all the philosophers, excepting Parraenides, 15 ) agree in deriving things from motion and compositioih 16 ) As this position, which I regard or essentially true, differs widely froin that held quite generally by historians of Greelc thought, it may be in order to pause long enough to indicate in the most suinmary way the grounds for this belief.
The real issue here concerns two principal points. First, what were the historical antecedents of the molecular theory of matter? Second, just what was implied in the monism of the lonians? Everything depends on the ansvvers given to these questions.
First, then, s to the molecular constitution of things. To my mind, this theory is the outgrowth of the observation of those 14 ) See Joachim, Aristott s Conception of Chemical Combination, in The Journal of Philology, vol. XXIX. no. 57, p. 72, foll. 15 ) This refers, of course, to his denial of multiplicity and ch nge in c Truth': but is it not significant that, in his Opinions of Men' he made a Jarge use of composition?
16
) Theaet. 152 D εκ δε orj φορίς τε και κινήσεως και κράσεω; προς άλληλα γίγνεται πάντα 3 οή φαμεν είναι ουκ ορθώς τφοσαγορεύοντες · εστί μεν γαρ ούξέτιοτ* ούοέν, άι\ δε γίγνεται. κα» ττερί τούτου πάντες έξης οι σοφοί ττλην Παρμενι'δου σνμφε-ρε' σ8<ΐ3ν, Πρωταγόρας τε και c Ηράκλειτος και Εμπεδοκλής, κτλ. It will not do to except all of his predecessors with Pannenides. The Opinions of Men' and Heraclitus sufficiently indicate the point of view. There is μίξις here, both of the vaguer sort, and of the more definite kind (represented by Empedocles), with fully defined eleraental substances. nieteorological phenomena commorily called evaporation (άναΟυμίασι>) and precipitation. It is clear that the appearance of the sun 'drawing water' early irapressed the Greek thinkers, Theophrastos refers to this phenomeuon to explain Thales's assumption that all is water. 17 ) From Anaximander onward every philosopher of importanco made a large and growing use of this conception for the explanation of things. Now this famili r process of evaporation and precipitation contained in erabryo the large operations of nature s they were gradually formulated in the course of time. First, it afforded an example of the diminution of one body and the enlargement of another by increments individually beyond human ken. It thus became the type of 'effluences' of all sorts, and the upward course of the vapors and the downward return of the precipitates exemplified the way up and down. Here also we are to find the meaning of rarefaction and condensation, with their synonyms heating and cooling. By evaporation air and fire encroach upon water and earth, and by precipitation water and earth encroach upon air and fire. Thus one typical form of existence (element, if you please) 'changes' into the other. These 'elements' may mix either in this sublimated form or eise in a more palpable form s when the sea drenches the sand on the shore, only to retire presently and leave it dry. It is a far cry from this simple conception to the elaborate theories of Empedocies or Democritus; but it is a case of ^old instincts hardening to new beliefs', s Lowell says. Our second question concerns the implications of monism s held by the lonians. Historians ancient and modern seem unable to conceive of the change of one element into another except s necessarily involving αλλοιωσίς. Aristotle of course took this View; but this need not daunt us s he was manifestly drawing a logical inference rather.than stating a certain fact supported by documen-1T ) Aet. L 3.1. It is clear that Theophrastus was merely amplifiying Arist. Met. 983 ^ 18 fpll., and referring the Avords αυτό το θερμόν εκ τούτου γιγνο'μενον -/.άι τούτφ ζών to the cosmic process of evaporation and the production and replenishment of fire from water by means of it. tary evidence.
18 ) It is not enough to show that such a conclusion must follow, unless one can likewise prove that both the premises were known and acknowledged by these early thinkers. Such proof has never been offered and it is hardly too much to say that it never will be offered. Besides, Aristotle's testimony here will appear even more discredited when it is seen that he tried, by the most inexcusable reinterpretation, to father upon Anaxa oras this saine doctrine, in spite of the clearest evidence that the philosopher did not and could not entertain. it.
19
) Aristotle cleaiiy discloses the grounds for his inference, viz. the assumption that the lonians had strictly defined the unity and self-identity of the elemental substance, the express condition of his doctrine of άλλοίωσις. *°) The attentive Student of Greek thought can hardly 1S ) Gen. et Corr. 314" a 8 όσοι μεν γαρ εν τι το παν λέγουσιν είναι και πάντα ες ενός γεννώσιν, τούτοις μεν ανάγκη την γένεσιν άλλοίωσιν φάναι καΐ το κυρίως γιγνόμενον άλλοιοϋσθαι* όσοι δε πλείω την υλην ενός τιθέασιν,. οίον Εμπεδοκλής και Αναξαγόρας καΐ Λεύκιππος, τούτοις δε έτερον, καίτοι ^Αναξαγόρας γε την οικείαν φωνην ήγνόησεν λέγει γουν ως το γίγνεσθαι και άπόλλυσ&αι ταύτόν καθέστηκε τψ άλλοιουσθαι.
Ibid. 314M τοις μεν ουν εξ ενός πάντα κατασκευάζουσιν άναγ-καΐον λέγειν την γένεσιν και την φθοράν άλλοίωσιν· αεί γαρ μένειν το υποκεί-μενον ταύτό και εν το δε τοιούτονάλλοιουσθαί φαμεν τοις δε τα γένη π/.είω ποιουσι διαφέρειν την άλλοίωσιν της γενέσεως· συνιο'ντων γαρ και διαλυομένων ή γένεσις συμβαίνει και ή φθορά, διό λέγει τούτον τον τρόπον και Εμπεδοκλής, ότι φύσις ο&δενός εστίν, άλλα μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων, ό'τι μεν ούν οικείος 6 λόγος αυτών ττ} υποθέσει ούτω φάναι, δήλον, και δτι λέγουσι τον τρόπον τούτον άναγκαϊον δε και τούτοις τί)ν άλλοίωσιν είναι μεν τι φάναι παρά την γένεσιν, αδύνατον μέντοι κατά τα υπ* εκείνων Λεγόμενα.
) More will be said below concerning this effort of Aristotle's to inake a place for his favorite conception of ά?λοίωσις in the Systems of Anaxagoras, Empedocles arid Leucippus. Here it is enough to note that he is compelled to do violence to their definitely expressed opinions to do so.
2 ) See n. 17 and the definition of άλλοίωσις, n. 4. Cp. Met. 983 b 6 των δη πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων l πλείστοι τάς εν δλης εί'δει μονάς φήθησαν αρχάς είναι πάντων ϊ\ ου γαρ έ'στιν απαντά τα οντά, και ες ου γίγνεται πρώτου και είς Ζ φθείρεται τελευταϊον, της μεν οόσίας υπομενούσης, τοις δε πάθεσι μετά-β αλλ ου ση ς, τούτο στοιχείο ν και ταύτη ν αρχήν φασιν είναι των όντων (Wh ο will suppose that Aristotle had any such definition of an element from the lonians?), και δια τούτο ούτε γίγνεσθαι ουδέν οιονται ουτ* άπόλλυσθαι, ως της τοιαύτης φύσεως αεί σωζόμενης , . . το μέντοι πλήθος και το είδος της τοιαύτης αρχής ου το α6τό πάντες λέγουσιν, αλλά Θαλής μεν δ της τοιαύτης αρχηγός φιλοσοφίας ύδωρ είναι φησιν. The raost casual reader will observe lau to see that Aristotle is pressing too rnuch the cooception of tiüity äs held by thc ionians. The thought that unity or identity excludes diflerence is the contribution of the Eleatics. Had Thaies and A n ax i inen es had t bis notion, they would have denied change outright, äs did Parmenides. The distinction between essence and attribute was not yet current.
Furthermore we are not to assume, äs historians ancient and modern are prone to do, that the lonians emphasized the same characteristics of the Elements' äs first occur to our minds. For exaraple: When Heraclitus and Democritus spoke of the soul äs fire, did they think first of the heat of fire, or of some other property? Diel Lucretius do justice to Heraclitus, when he urged the objection that, on his theory, the only diiferences effected in the elemental fire by its condensation or rarefaction would he expressible in degrees of temperature? 21 ) To ask such a question is to answer it. When Anaximenes and Heraclitus, to mention only two names, chose these terms to denominatethe process of differentiation, they gave unmistakable tokens of their deliberate intention: which clearly was to regard all other differences in things äs subordinate and incidental to variations in density. So much once granted, there would seem to be left n o, basis for the assumption of such äs Aristotle thought to discover in these early Systems. Early äs we find this conception emerging, I incline to think that the notion of difference consisting in the relative degree of density is not original, but that it is one of the first generalizations from the phenomena of evaporation and precipitation. It may be doubted whether this notion ever stood alöne äs the means of accounting for the varieties ofconcrete things, unless this holds true of the.System of Diogenes of Apollonia. It is not necessary to descänt on* the historical significance of this conception, äs leading directly to the ultimate assumption that the essential properties of things are the properties of mass. But, taken by itself, it does that Aristotle supposes Thales's 'elemenf defined äs precisely äs Empedocles's. It need hardly be said that this supposition affords a weak fcrandation for a theory of changes. What are we to say of this thought that things change their characters by recomposition? Some would have us think that i t was a theory contrived to meet the fatal objections of Parmenides to the doctrine of άλλοίωσις. My discussion of the question thus far must have shown that I cannot accept this view. It is common to say that the difficulties raised by the Eleatics in regard to the One and the Many in predication were in large measure due to the Substantive character attributed to the copula. There is, no doubt, much truth in this contention; but it does not touch the heart of the matter. The difficulty, s I conceive it, is with the predicate even more than with the copula. In other words, the predicate, whether noun or adjective, was regarded s Substantive. What is implied in this assumption?
The question at issue is, in the last analysis, whether primitive man conceived of qualities s abstract, or s material constituents or ingredients of things. The only phrase in Parmenides which relates to change of quality is δια τε χρόα φανον άμείβειν (fr. 8, 41). One has only to consider the meaning of χρως, χροιά and χρώμα (signifying the surface s much s the color) and the verbs that go with these nouns to express change -διαμεφειν, άμεφειν, άλλάσσειν -all of which suggest exchange^ to see that color is no abstraction; s indeed it would be surprising if so remote a conception should be found to be original. When Shakespeare said "Youth's a stuff will not endure", he used an expression that is true to primitive notions, s Λνβ meet them in such statenients s that in Proverbs 27, 22 cc Though thou shouldest bray a fool in a mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet Λνίΐΐ not his foolishness depart from him'V Here foily is evidently thought of s an admixture, like the soul according to Epicurus, a σώμα λεπτομερές τταρ* όλον το άθροισμα τταρεαπαρμένον. When, therefore, we find Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the Atomists taking this view of qualities, it is certainly more reasonable to suppose that they are raerely adapting an old notion to the needs of philosophy than to believc tlus a newly contrived hypothesis to meet the objections of Parmonides. The dialectic of the Eleatic did corapel a revision of previous views; but this revision was in the nature of a clearer definition of the process and of a sharper formulation of the eleanentai characters, in accordanee with the assumed nature of the truly Existent 1 , s unchangeable and homogeneous, which terms are practically synonymous.
If.
We have now tarried among these general considerations quite long enough, and inust turn to the several pre-Socratic philosophies to weigh the claims of άλλοι'ωβι» made in regard to them by Aristotle and tfie doxographers.
It is clear that Aristotle attributed άλλοίωσις, in his sense, to Thaies and all the monists.
32
) The doxographers followed him 7 and added a conception of composition, likewise involving άλλοι'ωσις, that is strictly Aristotelian.
23 ) It would be futile to discuss the matter in respect to Thaies, of whose opinions in detail we knovv next to nothing. Anaxiniander presents an interesting problern, because Aristotle and Theophrastus, our most important \vitnesses ? iare not agreed on the chief point. We cannot here discuss the matter exhaustively, but there are three subjects that require consideration: -(1) the conception of the "Απειρον; (2) the meaning of εχχρισις or αποχριαις; (3) the nature and function of the κίνησις άιδιος. ) being chiefly concerned about its spatial infinitude. How much truth there is in this view will presently appear.
(2) The iraportant fact in regard to Anaximander is that he had a definite view of the process of · differentiation: there is. no doubt that he spoke of it s εκκρισις or άποκρισις. And Aristotle clearly acknowledges the affinity of this process with the winnowing and sifting of like to like out of the πάντα δμοδ of Anaxagoras and Ernpedocles.
27 ) Take what view of the matter we will, it is impossible to think of these processes, historically related s antecedent and consequent, otherwise than s essentially alike. If there is a difterence, s not irnprobably there is, it would seem most reasonable to seek this diiference in a greater degree of definiteness s to method and presuppositions in the later Systems. Now, if we inquire just what Anaximander had in mind, the most plausible answer appears to be this: He held the naive opinion that a substance -say the "Απειρον -may possess various 4 qualities', and that these qnalities are really in that object in the form of ingredients, possibly so confused and blended that none assurnes remote, and (with Doring, Gesch. der gr. Philos., L 32) "da er die Bezeichnung 'Gemisch' nur f r die Fassung des Urzustandes des Stoffes bei Empedokles und Anaxagoras gebraucht"; but it is indisputable that Aristotle represents their conceptions s essentially similar or parallel, and that the point of coraparison is in the word μίγμα. We may well believe that Aristotle did not attribute to Anaximander "ein Gemenge verschiedener, ihre qualitativen Unterschiede in der Mischung festhaltender Stoffe" (Zeller), in the sense of true elements, without concluding that he thought of the Άττειρον s qualitatively indeterminate.
25
) Diels, Dox. 479, 12 μιαν φύβιν αόριστον και κατ'είδος ν.αί κατά μέγεθος. We should note here in passing; what will be more clearly shown below, that these words occur in a passage which is strongly under the influence of Aristotle's violent reinterpretation of Anaxagoras and does justice neither to hira nor to Anaximander. a considerablc prominence. The theogonic conception of a Chaos would suggest so mach. This view is amply confirmed by Aristotle's phrase έχ του evo; ένουσας* 8 ) τάς έναντιότητας έχχρίνεαΟαι, if we take the words in the sense they must have borne for Anaximander, rather than with the suggestions they had Ibr Aristotle, 2 *) who is notoriously prone to read his own thoughts into the words of his predecessors.
(3) We have seen that Aristotle distinctly associated εχχριαις with the winnowing of like unto like assumed s the initial cosmic process by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. Yet 28 ) It may not be out of place at this point to suggest that the notion of qualities Mnhering' in substances is probably a 'survival' of the conception of a quality, viewed s a physicai constituent, present in an άθροισμα. This is the meaning of μετέχειν and παρειναι in the pre-Socratics; whereas in Plato μεθεξις and παρουσία represent the doctrine of logical realism for which things participate in Ideas. The primitive notion of a thing is that it 'contains' certain qualities, the point of view being purely physicai. The logical, or psychological view is that a quality is one of the 'meanings' of a c thing', both 'thing' and 'meanings' being constructs growing out of certain interests directed to the realization of ends. On this view 'inherence' is meaningless and constitutes no problem. But in the transition from the physicai to the psychological conception of qualities and things, a blending of the two points of view took place. The general stock of like 4 stuiT of which a thing partakes in virtue of containing that quality, is converted into an Idea, half abstract and half concrete; and at once there arises the problem of relati g the thing, s concrete, with the Idea, s abstract, and of relating the Ideas amqng themselves. This problem was to be solved only by a complete abandonment of the physicai point of view with its implications. Aristotle was s much under the spell of the old conception s was Plato: his importation of the distinction between potentiality and actuality raised a false issue and retarded the solution.
29
) There are two that we may mention: (1) The word έναντιότητες involved for Aristotle a hint of the elements (worked out by Simpl. Phys. 150,-24) and also of άλλοίωσις, every change from one thing to its opposite or from a neutral μεταξύ to contrarieties having for Aristotle that implication (see n. 4).
(2) Aristotle, no doubt, thought of the inherence of the contrarieties in thê Άπειρον s 4 potentiaP; but this conception cannot apply to Anaxiinander. That the latter did speak of inherence, however, is clear from the fact that he spoke of εκκρισις. The reference to unity (εκ του ενός), which may be Aristotle's contribution, would not prove the contrary even if it belonged to Anaximander; for even Empedocles fr. 17 used unity in this lax sense. The attempt to father the Eleatic One upon Anaximander, Empedocles, aud Democritus (see below, nn. 105, 107, 123) created the illusion of άλλοίωσις. quite without such a hint from Aristotle, the conclusion would inevitably follow from any intelligent reading of pre-Socratic thought for εκχρισι;, άπόκρισις and διάκρισις always bear more or less definitely this acknowledged sense. But Aristotle doubtless supposed this change to involve αλλοίωσης, 30 ) whereas Simplicius, whether of bis own accord or, s I prefer to think, on the authority of Theophrastus, asserts the contrary, explainiog the process of όίπόκρισις by the Operation of the everlasting motion. 31 ) In this matter we rnust take our stand with Simplicius. It is difficult to say just what was the nature of this everlastiog motion. Some prefer to think of it s mysterious and vital, s opposed to mechanical, because it is associated with the hylozoic or hylopsychic principle; 32 ) but there is no reason to think that there was any such distinction recognized. Aristotle also regarded the world s a ζωον; yet the operations within bis cosmos are all mechanically conditioned. Why should we think otherwise of Anaximander? We do not know whether he distinguished between a primordial motion, obtaining in the universe at large, and a secondary motion operating in the cosmos; yet this would seein improbable in so early a thinker. However, the notion of a circular inotion of the world included within the stellar sphere is so imme- 
31
) Diels, Z>ox., 476, 8 ούτος δε ουκ αλλοιουμένου του στοιχείου την γένεσιν τοιε!, αλλ* άποκρινομένων των εναντίων δια της άιδίου κινήσεως, διό καΐ τοις περί Αναζαγ<5ραν τούτον 6 Αριστοτέλης συνέταξεν. While Simplic. here refers only to Arist. Phys. 187 a 20 foll., the dependence of bis Statement on Theophrastus is not unlikely. Aristotle says nothing of the άίδιος κίνησις, whereas Simplicius's further Statements, in this connection, touching Anaximenes and Diogenes, are, s I tbink rightly, ascribed by Dieis to Theophrastus. In regard to Anaximenes tbe reference to κίνησις άίδιος is explicitly made, and it seeras to me to be made implicitly also of Diogenes. Aristotle's belief that all before Anaxagoras had failed to postulate an αρχή της κινήσεως ( s distinct from the material principle) kept Mm from seeing the true relation of things; whereas Theophrastus seems to have emphasized tbis factor.
32
) See e. g. Doring, L 33. 23* diately suggeated by'the naive view of nature 3 *), and is withal so entircly in harmony with the cosmology of Anaximander, 34 ) that the unbiasod Student must be led to believe that our philosopher had this in mind when he spoke of the everlasting motion. Such, at any rate, is the agency recognized by later thinkers who adopted the notion of a cosmic 'winnowing 3 by which the world of particular things arises. The philosophy of Anaximenes, though perhaps less captivating to the modern Imagination, difters from that of Anaximander chiefly in the direction of a more precise definition, undertaken in the interest of true science. The vague v Απειρον comes to be viewed s Air infinite in extent: s Air, its character is determined; but this does not imply absolute homogeneity. Indeed, it might be guessed that the predecessor of Parmenides, while tending toward greater precision, did not effect the synthesis of the εν and the δμοιον, which constituted the central thought of the Eleatics; but the nature of the process of differentiation proves beyond question the essential inequalities in distribution of the elemental Air. 
35
) Hippolytus, Diels, Dox. 560, 16 το δε εΐδος τοδ αέρος τοιούτον όταν μ.έν δμαλώτ-ατος (i.e. most evenly distributed,. with least πίληαις) ή, όψει αδηλον ( s in atmospheric air), δηλοΰσθαι δε τψ ψ^χρψ χ«ι τφ θερμψ και τ«7 νοτερψ και τψ κινουμένψ. These changes are all incident and eq ivalent to changes in distribution consequent on motion. Cp. nn. 140 and 141. 36 ) Simplic., Diels, Dox. 477, 4 κίνησιν δε καΐ ούτος ( s well s Anaximander, See n. 30) άίδιον ποιεί, δι* ην και την μεταβολήν γίνεσ&αι. Ibid. l δια-φέρειν δε μ,ανότητι και πυκνότητι κατά τάς ουσίας, και άραιοόμενον μεν πυρ γίνεσθαι, πυκνούμενον δε ανεμον, είτα' νέφος, ίτι δε μάλλον δδωρ, είτα γην, είτα λίθους, τα δε αλλά εκ τούτων.
The evicience here that this motion, within the cosmos, is the famili r vortex is entirely satisfactory. 37 ) We have already observed that Aristotle regarded this process of rarefaction and condensation s involving άλλοίωσις; 38 ) it remains for us to inqaire whether he was justified in his thought of Anaximenes. To support his view it would be necessary to show, not only that such a conclusion would follow from the assumptions of Anaximenes, but also that the philosopher was aware of the implications of his cloctrine. This, however, it seems impossible to pro\ 7 e. 39 ) O the contrary, it was clearly the purpose of Anaximenes to represent the niethod of differentiation s mechanical, and there is no hint of a chemical doctrine of allotropism conditioned by purely physical states. The assumption of inequalities in the elemental Air shows that it was not conceived either s qualitatively neutral or s qualitatively homogeneous to a degree making it necessary to account for the emergence of properties otherwise than s incident to extension or compression. Indeed, the whole development of Greek thought tends to show that what we call 'secondary' qualities ( s a result of that very course of thought) were esteemed negligible in the account of nature's operations. Hence we may safely conclude that Anaximenes, who was most distinctly the forerunner of this theory, had no such conception s that of άλλοίωσις. Siinplicius distinctly connected the process of rarefaction and condensation with the sifting and winnowing of like to like, 40 . n., says that Plato, Theaet. 181B foll., gives it s the meaning of Heraclitus's dictum πάντα ρεϊ that it implies both περιφορά and αλλοίωση "aber so, da man deutlich sieht, wie erst Plato diese beiden Arten der Bewegung unterscheidet"; but when he proceeds to Interpret Heraclitus (pp. 652-4) he appears to attribute άλλοίωσις to him without actually employing the term. of it will however be necessary, and the Interpretation here proposed must be left to commend itself without the citation of such authorities s rnay be in agreement at one point or another, As Anaximenes, impressed with the phenomena of evaporation and precipitation, sublimated the Water of Thaies to Air (or vapor), so Heraclitus, going one step farther, made Fire his principle He adopted also the lonian doctrine of an everlasting motion and made of it the central thought of his philosophy -πάντα ρεΐ. Fire, the ever-living (άείζωον, fr. 30), is all and all in all, because it embodies this process. Apparently Heraclitus did not say just what he mearit by fire, or rather, just what fire was to his inind; one may safely assume, however, that he was not conscious of speaking synibolically. If he had been pressed for a definite answer, it is more than probable that he could not have given one. Certain it is that we are not in position to do so.
We may infer however, that he had in mind certain obvious characteristics of fire. Among them we may enumerate: the change effected by coinbustion in the constitution of that which is subjected to it; the freeing from the mass consumed of particles that 'blend 5 with the fire (for, be it remembered that fire was regarded s a substance until very recent times) and thus change character; the streain of particles given off by the fire in the form of sparks or sinoke; and the difference in the time required for the consumption (or conVersion into fire) of various substances under given conditions. Undoubtedly he thougt of fire s hot; but it is improbable that heat was regarded by him s its chief characteristic. Indeed, it is evident that he supposed this 'property' to vanish when fire was most Condensed in the form of earth. He seems to have spoken of the limits of the process of rarefaction and condensation s 'kindling' and 'extinguishing'. 46 )
To begin with the cosmic process, the libration between the One, when all is fire to 'satiety', and the Many, when all is at war, 47 ) This conclusion rests on Laert. Diog. IX. 9, where the cosmic changes seem to require a δίνη. This is denied by many, but it seems to be confirmed by the figure of the potter's wheel, [Hippocr.] de Victu (Vorsokr. p. 88, 10 foll.).
51
) The mere absence of express mention of so obvious a notion, t after it had once been employed, s it was by Anaximenes, ean of course prove nothing. a view widely held by early thinkers.
52 ) This phenomenon was readily misconceived s implying the conversion of one element into another, and therefore s affordiog a notable example of άλλούυσις. But the case of Empedocles should suffice to dispel such illusions. As the same arguments hold for Heraclitus s for Anaximenes, s regards the supposed implication of άλλοίωσις in the assurnption of differentiation by rarefaction and condensation, there is no need of here recurring to that theme.
The next subject calling for discussion is whether Heraclitus regarded all particular things s occupying each its determinate place in a graduated scale of tenuity or density ranging from pure fire to-earth, or whether he explained the individuality of things in some other way. The former alternative is exceedingly unlikely; for, on that view, the assuinption of a triad of quasi-eleniental substances would be more than useless, every degree in the scale being equally elemental and equally derivative. We must therefore look elsewhere for a principle of individuation; and this inquiry leads finally to a consideration of three doctrines which are fundamental to the thought of Heraclitus: namely, the flux of all things, the coexistence of contrarieties, and the relativity of qualities.
We have said that Heraclitus adopted the everlasting motion of his predecessors, which in the cosmic process was doubtless conceived s rotary. But its activity does not exhaust itself in the vortex that created the cosmos. It results in a movement upward and downward typified by evaporation and precipitation. Everything but the Elements', we are told, is produced by this process. This Statement may readily be pressed overmuch; for it is scarcely credible that Heraclitus would have said without. ) See fr. 125 και ό κυκεών διίαταται (μη) κινούμενος. The importance of this utterance is shown by the' fact that Epicurus (cp. Laert. Diog. X. 8), doubtless because of it, called Heraclitus κυκητής. The same notion reappears in fr. 52 αιών τ.άίς εστί παίζων, πεττεύων, amplified or more correctly reported by Lucian Vit. Auct. 14 τί γαρ δ αίών εστίν; -τιαις παίζων, πεσσεύων, (συμφε-ρόμενος) διαφερο'μενος. Cp. also n. 54, above. The world is a game of chance; s the proverb has it, quite possibly after Heraclitus, τύνη άνω καί κώτω τα ανθρώπεια ττεττεύει. The shaking of the dice, with the infinity of possible throws, where the dice are so many, admirably illustrates a molecular world kept in motion and passing from combination to combination in kaleidoscopic changes. See Lucret. V. 187 foll., 422 foll. for the Atomists and Epicurus, and Plato, Legg. 889 B foll., for Empedocles. This explanation, common to raost of the Greek thinkers, may be accepted s fairly well assurecL Theophrastus, 68 ) following Aristotle, discovered αλλοίωσις in Heraclitus's doctrine of sense-perception, assumiog that the principle of contrast in certain sensations involved the denial of interaction between sirailars and the affirmation that only dissimilars can react. Aristotle, indeed, goes so far s to say that most pliilosophers agree in the opinion that only unlike or opposite substances can act and react on each other, their interaction being such s properly to be called άλλοίωσις, 69 ) and that perception is one form of interaction. Here we see a striking Illustration of the efl'ect of Aristotle's prepossessions on his reading of history, and, in consequence, through Theophrastus, on the doxographic tradition. As we have said before, any change from one state to another contrasted state or any change in any \vay involving contrariety seems to Aristotle to involve άλλοίωσις. Furthermore, the Statement that most philosophers believed in interaction between the unlike is demonstrably false, so far s it relates to the pre-Socratics. 
6S
) De Sensu l οι δε περί !Αναςαγόραν VM\ °Ηρακλειτον τιυ έναντι^ ( CT. xrjv αί'σθησιν τιοιοϋσιν) ... 2 οί δε (sc. Heraclitus and Anaxagoras) την αι'σθησιν ΰττολαμβάνοντες εν αλλοιώσει γίνεσΟαι και το μεν δμοιον απαθές οπό του ομοίου, το δ' εναντίον παθητιχόν, τουτφ προσέθεσαν την γνώμην έπιμαρτυρείν δε οίονται και το περί την άφην συμβαίνον το γαρ ομοίως ττ} σαρκί θερμόν ή ψυχρόν o ποιειν αίσθησιν. Theophrastus might with equal propriety have included the Pythagoreans in his list; cp. Arist. de Cado 290^ 24 έπε! ο* άλογον έδόκει το μη συνακούειν ημάς της φωνής ταύτης (the c music of the spheres') αίτιον τούτου φασιν είναι το γιγνομενοις ε&Θυς υπαρχειν τον ψόφον, ώστε μη δια'δηλον είναι προς την έναντίαν σιγήν προς άλληλα γαρ φωνής και σιγής είναι την διάγνωσιν. See below on Anaxagoras, Democritus and Diogenes. What then shall we say of Aristotle's dictum? The only justification for it -and that merely apparent -is to be found in the field of psychology. Not only Heraclitus, 76 ) but other philosophers also, held that mental states of whatever character, whether pleasurepains or cognitive states required contrast, to set them off. Heraclitus, indeed, may have emphasized this factin connection with his doctrine of universal change, asserting that instability and variation were a source of pleasure.
)

77
) These facts are, however, in any case of a wholiy different order from those which appealed to the pre-Socratics s involving interaction; hence, while they affirmed without reserve the principle ομοιον δμοίφ, they generally acknow-72 ) The doctriae of general mixture is admitted for Anaxagoras, but ofte denied (e. g. by Zeller, L 762 and n. 3). for Empedocles: but see Arist., de Anima 410^ 6 έχ πάντων γαρ εκαστον. It would perhaps require more space than can here be allowed to verify the claim that the motive for this doctrine was s stated; but see my study, ledged, without any sense of incongruity, the psychological significance of contrast. 78 ) To be rnore explicit, the principle δμοιον δμοι'φ, wherever applied, assumes that everything is composite in character, the several elements in one body responding to their kind in another. The principle of psychological contrast makes no such assunaption. Hence, s has been said, the principles are of different Orders and do not conflict. The treatise De Victu, traditionally ascribed to Hippocrates, presents a singularly interesting problem, which we cannot here discuss. Its chronology is of the great est importance to the adjudication of many a dispute in the history of Greek philosophy. It is not my purpose here to express a definite opinion on this question; for indeed I must confess that I have hitherto been unable to form one. I raay be permitted to say, however, that, s between Zeller and Teichm ller, the latter has in my opinion the better of the argurnent, though hiraself at many points in error.
The cardinal defect in the reasoning of Teichm ller, s indeed of all who have discussed this matter, is the assumption that there is no alternative but out and out άλλοίωσις or atomism of the most pronounced type. The case of Erapedocles should have warned historians against this conclusion; but many have preferred to consider him a degenerate rather than a prophet. The corpascular theory, if we may so call it, is much older than atoraism. It rests upon the assumption of minute effluences, certainly m ade by Heraclitus and possibly by Anaximander. Schuster, Zeller, and Teichm ller one und all ignore this patent fact in. discussing the treatise περί οιαίτη?.
Thus Schuster and Zeller find in the tractate the doctrine of 'unalterable elements 5 , against which Teichm ller argues with mani-
7S
) The evidence will appear below. This fact, that philosophers who stated the physical principle δμοιον· όμοίψ with all emphasis held witbout compunction the psychological doctrine in question, can not be too strongly stated: for it is highly significant and does not appear to have been remarked. The fact that Aristotle and Theopbrastus were profoundly interested in the psychological problem is likewise significant and may explain their patent misstatement of history. fest success; but he at once concludes that the author definitely assorted the 'qualitative Uebergaog der Dinge in einander', givi g s evidence the fact that the words άλλοιοόμενα, άλλοιουται etc. tire constantly recurriog. Teichm ller also refers 79 ) to the periodic encroachment of fire upon water and vice versa s conclusive evidence of άλλοίωσις; but he is in error on both pointe. The reference to the author's use of άλλοιουται shows beautifully how superficial much of the study of Greek philosophy has been; for the author himself says in the most unequivocal terms that the change of which he spealcs is effected by composition and decomposition. 80 Hence, where others have thought to find the most convincing evidence of the doctrine of άλλοίωσις, we discover on the contrary a clear Statement of change in character by recomposition without the assumption of indivisible, unalterable molecules or atoms. Whatever the chronology of the tractate, it falls logically in the interval between Heraclitus and his successors, Empedocles and Anaxagoras. The author displays no concern whatever about the logical difficulties raised by Parmenides.
Of the early Pythagoreans there is no occasion to speak in this connection, s the static nature of their principles did not compel attention to the problem of change. At all events, there is no satisfactory evidence that they considered it.
82 ) The Eleatics next cla n our attention. And here we begin with Parmenides, s the general terms and considerations to which Xenophanes confined himself yield no materials for our present inquiry. The philosophy of Parmenides, however, made the problem of change one of the main issues. As I have elsewhere pointed out, 83 ) the distinctive contribution made by the Eleatics to philosophy was the strictly formulated postulate of the unity of the world interpreted s nieaning fiomogeneity. The virtual identification of these two concepts-both old and generally accepted -δια τοδε· το μεν -ύρ έπεςιόν επί το εσχατον του ύδατος έπιλείττει ττ; τροφή, απο-τρέπεται ούν όκόθεν μέλλει τρέφεσοαι (cp. Aet. II. 17, 4 for Heraclitus; Arist, Meteor. 354 h 33 foll.; for Diogenes of Apollonia, see Diels, Vorsokr. 354, 22, Dox. 494, δ; see also Lucret V. 524 folL aud Usener, JEpicur. p. 383). το δε υοωρ έπεςιόν επί το εαχατον το!3 πυρός έπιλείπει ή κίνησις. ισταται ούν εν τούτψ.
[Uere ihe implication is clear: the author refers to the Αναθυμιάσεις and the diminution and replenishraent of the several maxima mundi membra eifected by them. Where is the warrant for the assertion that άλλοίωσιςίβ intended?]. όκόταν δε σττ], ουκ έτι εγκρατές εστίν, αλλά δί; τφ έμπίπτοντι πυρι ες την τροφην καταναλί-σκεται, ούδέτερον δε δια ταύτα δύναται κρατησαι παντελώς* ει δε κοτε κρατηθειη και οκότερον ουδέν αν ειη των νυν έοντων ώσπερ ε/ει νυν. For water nourishing fire in this meteorological sense, see Aet L 3, l (Dox. 276 a 20 folL), where Theophrastus imputes this thought to Thaies, making somewhat more specific the conjecture of Arist, J/A 983^ 23 foll. Cp. also n. 103, below. led to a vicw of the unity of thc vvorld that exerted a profouod influence on «all subsequent pre-8ocratic thought. With the Eleatics the problem of the Ooe aad the Many, which had hitherto been handled in the practical spirit of daily Jife and empirical science, 84 ) entered the sphere of logic and metaphysics. The homogeneity of substance, which was the chief outcome of this dialectical movement, was henceforth generally accepted: the differences between subsequent Systems relate to the nurnber of substances postulated and to the means of eflecting interaction between them. Empedocles and Anaxagoras posited multiple elements; Diogenes and the Atomists clung to the conception of a single substance, but its unity and homogeneity were less strictly defined than by the Eleatics.
85 )
In bis negative dialectic Parmenides arrived at the position that the One excluded difference, thus admitting of no change; for change of any sort must involve two kinds of difference, to wit, difference in character and diiference in time. The latter kind of diiference doubtless coucerned the Eleatics in the argiiments against motion founded. on the analysis of time into discrete moments. The former kind contravened their assumption of the unity and homogeneity of substance. For, holding, s we have said, that qualities are Substantive ingredients, they could not admit that their One comprehended within itself differences of character. The only example of qualitative change of which we find mention in Parmenides relates to color or complexion. It is not of such sort that one could discern in it a hin t of the Aristotelian άλλοιωσις. 86 )
Passing to that part of Parmenides's treatise which dealt w.ith 84 ) One has only to think of Heraclitus fr. 10 εκ πάντων εν (cp. Arist., de Anima 4lQ.b 6 εκ πάντων γαρ εκαστον, speaking of Empedocles), fr. 50 εν πάντα είναι, fr. 57 εστί γαρ εν (to wit, day and night, cp, above, n. 60), fr. 89. See also [Hippocr.] de Victu L 15 and Plato, Tim, 68 D, 85 ) The Atomists, by assuming specific kinds (i. e. shapes) of atoms s constituting specific kinds of matter, virtually abandoned their principle that all substance is identical, and Diogenes clearly assumed inequalities in the distribution of the elemental Air that were equivalent to qualitative differences. Parmenides expressly excluded differences in density. the Opinions of Men, 87 ) we find certain suggestions s to the manner in which he thought of qualitative change. Here he spoke of two elemental substances, fire and earth. They appear pure and unmixed at the extremes of the evolving world, <-fire at the periphery, earth at the center. All between is a mixture of these elements.
88 ) The goddess of Love, s the deity presiding over union (μ&ς)
89
) and generation, rules in the mixed sphere.
90 ) The differentiation of thing from thing is due to the A 7 arying proportions in which the elements unite.
91 ) The soul is a compound of earth and fire, and s it perceives things in virtue of the action of like on like, . the character of the perception (and hence of thought also) varies with the proportions of the elements to be found in individual souls.
92 ) The doctrine that everything pos- 0 Theophr. de Sensu l and 3, Macrob. SOL I. 14, 20.
3 ) Theophr. de Sensu 3 ζαί δλως δε παν το ον εχειν τινά γνώσιν. 24* ing the fyioiov 04 ). that he had given the matter some thought, but they are too inconclusive to aiFord mach insight into his point of view.
In the case of Melissas we have an unmistakable instance of the contaminatioa of our sources by the importation of Aristotelian terminology. Later accounts here speak unequivocally of the Aristoteliaa conception of άλλοίωσις, 95 ) attributing it not to Melissas alone but affirming that everybody so understood the process of qualitative change. 96 ) For once we are in the fortunate position of being able to check the Peripatetic paraphrase with the original. Melissas uses vario s expressions for change, such s μεταπίπτειν, έτεροιοδσθαι, έτεροΐον γίγνεσοαι, μετακοσμεΓσ&αι.
97
) All of these are quite general and are of course opposed to the postulate that the All be εν and ομοιον. Only one of them has a meaning clear enough to bear a definite Interpretation, to wit, μετακοσμεΐσοαι, especially when, s here, it is reinforced by κόσμος. ) Laert. Diog. IX. 24 έδόκει οέ οώτω το παν άπειρον είναι και αναλλοί-ωτο ν και άκί'νητον και §ν δμοιον έαυτψ καί πλήρες. The tractate de M. X. <?. 974 a 18 says τοιούτον δε δν το εν άνώδυνόν τε και άνάλγητον ύγιε'ς τε καί ανοσον είναι, οδτε μετακοσμούμενον θέσει,ούτε έτεροιούμενον εί'δει οδτε μιγνυμενον αλλφ. This is intended to restate Melissus fr. 7. There, however, there is nothing to correspond to the words θέσει, εϊδει, or μιγνυμενον άλλψ. These additions are not contrary to the meaning of Melissus excepting that of εί'δει, which clearly presupposes the Aristotelian definition of άλλοfωσις, according to which a thing remains the same γένει but changes είδει. The word είδη occurs in Melissus fr. 8, but Diels correctly renders it 'Gestalten'. 96 ) De M. X. G. 976^29 τί και την εν τψ αύτιίϊ' μένοντος του πράγματος τοπφ (see Plato, above, n. 2, and Aristotle, above, nn. 4 and 19) του είδους μετά-βολήν, ην άλλοίωσιν ο? τε άλλοι κάκεινος λέγει, and 977 ^ 2 άλλοιουμένου -ούδενός. προσγιγνομένου ούδ* άπογιγνομένου σώματος.
) See Melissus fragments 7 and 8.
98
) Fr. 7, 3 αλλ' ουδέ μετακοσμηθήναι άνυστόν ό γαρ κόσμος ό πρόσθεν έών ουκ άπόλλυται ούτε 6 μη έών γίνεται. Here κόσμος clearly means c order', Arrangement 5 , 'fashion*. Now Melissus unmistakably regards έτεροίουσθαι s involving μετακόσμησις; see fr, 7, 3 δτε δε μ,ήτε προσγίνεται μηδέν μήτε άπο'λλυται μήτε έτεροιοϋται, πώς αν μετακοσμηθέν των έόντων ειη; εί μεν γαρ τι έγίνετο έτε-ροΐον, ήδη αν και μετακοσμηθείη. Cp. fr. 7, 4 and 5, fr. 8, 2 and 3. This is the yiew of the Atomists, except that it takes no account of μίξις. See belown n. 122 foll. It is noteworthy that change here reappears s θάνατος (fr. 7
fore, it may be seen that the Aristotelian notion of αλλοιωσις was fathered upon one of the pre-Socratics for no other reason, apparently, but that he einployed the terin έτεροιοΰσθαι which was regarded s a synonym for άλλοιουσ&οα and interpreted accordingly from the point of view of the Peripatetics. We should not be surprised at this when we recall that modern historians have fallen into the same snare.
We may now turn to Empedocles. Accepting the dictum of the Eleatics that, assuming the fact of multiplicity, the Many rnust have the same characteristics which they postulated for the One, 99 ) he asserted the existence offourtrue elements, eternal and unchangeable. 100 ) Hence all change is secondary, an epiphenomenon of inixture or recomposition eifected by effluences from one thing entering into the pores of another.
101 ) This doctrine is so clearly held and so unambiguously stated that there would seem to be left no room for misapprehension. Yet misapprehension has arisen at two points, both of which are instructive. Empedocles twice speaks of the periodic encroachment of one element upon the other,
102
) and this notion is said by Simplicius to involve change of one into another, 103 ) which to him of course means άλλοίωσι;. There can be no doubt that Simplicius was in error, and S). The implication of the notion being so unmistakable here, we may safely conclude that Heraelitns, from whom the figure was bprrowed, understood it in the same way. In θάνατος there is added the notion of μίξις which did not appear in fr. 7, 3. See n. 55 on Heraclitus.
") The words are those of Melissus fr. 8, but the thought may have come from Parmenides. 100) jjj e evidence appears below.
101
) See Zeller L 767, 3 for the testimony of Aristotle. See above, n. 17 and Aet. I. 24, 2 qnoted below, n. 109. Emped. fr. 21, 13 αυτά γαρ εστίν ταατα, δ' αλλήλων οέ θέοντα j γίγνεται άλλοιωτ:«· τόσον δια κρησις αμείβει. For the άπορροιαί see Diels, Vorsokr. Emped., A 86, 87, 88, 89; B 84, 89, 91, 101;  for the pores, ibid. A 86, 87; B 84. Interaction by effluvia and pores rests upon the action of like on like. The best brief Statement of this matter with which I am acquainted is that of Karsten, Empedokles 396. though therc may be some doubt s to Empedocles's real conception. He may havc meaut no more thao that, in the formation and subsequent vicissitudes of the world, the maxima mundi membra, which in his scheme were synonymous with the elements, successively dominated each other. Thisnotion, grown traditional, 104 ) vvould naturally be stated s if it reJated to the elements s such, whereas in strict logic it could apply only to earth, water, air and lire regarded, like everything eise in the world, 105 ) s mixtores of all the elements.
The other case relates to the question of the One and the Many, with which Empedocles had in some way to deal. The One he found in the union of the elements in the Sphere; the Many, in their segregation.
106
) Here was an opportunity for the display of that want of historical insight which was not uncommon in the Aristotelian commentators. Aristotle himself, apparently unable to view the One except in the form, originated by Parmenides, of an absolute unity utterly homogeneous, charges Empedocles with inconsistency in maintaining, first, that the elements do not arise one from the other, and, secondly, that everything becomes one and in turn coines from one.
107 ) The commentator states s historical 10 *) See above, n. 81.
10δ
) See above, n. 72. The connection of this with the τροφή or replenishment of the maxima mundi membra in compensation for the losses they sustain, is suggested also by [Hippocr.] de Nat. Hominis^ K hn L p. 359 ώσπερ ό ένιαυτος (with this cp. my note on summer and winter in Heraclitus, n. 61, above) μετέχει μεν πάς πάντων των ένεόύτων εν τωδε τψ κόσμος, άλλ^ ει εν τι έκλίποι, πάντ 5 αν άφανισθείη · από γαρ της αύτέης ανάγκης πάντα ξυνέστηκέ τε και τρέφεται υπ 5 αλλήλων.
10G
) See e.g. fr. 17. ' ' 107 ) Arist., de Gen. et Corr. 315 a 3 Έ. μεν ουν εοικεν εναντία λέγειν και προς τα φαινόμενα και προς αξ>τόν α6τ<ίς. άμα μεν γαρ ου φησιν έ'τερον εξ ετέρου γίνεσθαι των στοιχείων ουδέν (cp. also 314b 20 foll.), όλλά ταλλα πάντα εκ τούτων, άμα δ* όταν εις εν συναγάγη την δπασαν φυσιν πλην του Νείκους, εκ του ενός γίνεσθαι πάλιν έ'καστον. See also ibid. 329 h l foll., 333 a 16 foll., Met. 984 a 8 foll. Έ. δε τα τέτταρα, προς τοις είρημένοις γην προστιθεις τέταρτον -ταΰτα γαρ αεί διαμένειν και ου γίγνεσθαι αλλ' ή πλήθει και όλιγότητι συγκρινο'μενα και δια-κρινόμενα εις εν τε και εξ ενός. The phrase όλλ 0 ή πλήθει και δλιγότητι does not seem to be understood. It means 'except in respect of number', πλήθος και δλιγότης, like so many pairs of abstract correlates, expressing together the fact what Aristotle had in mind only s an unconscious prejudice, 108 ) thus imputing to Empedocles άλλοίωσις of the most approved type.
It requires but a moment's reflection to perceive that there is liere a repetition of tlie Theophrastean fallacy touching Anaximander and of the Aristotelian fiction regarding Anaxagoras. Had Empedocles accepted the Eleatic One, he would never have postulated a multiplicity, to the units of which he attributed the same character. There is, therefore, no basis of fact whatever for the assnmption of a qualitative change in his systein other than that effected by the composition of elementary substances interacting through effluences and pores.
Anaxagoras excited the interest of Socrates and Plato by the introduction of teleological considerations. Aristotle also was uncommonly attracted by Anaxagoras and owed to him several conceptions of the first importance to his own philosophy, such s the naore precise conception of Deity and of the relation of God to the world. This circumstance may in part explain Aristotle's repeated efforts to restate the thought of Anaxagoras in terms that appeared to him. dictated by reason. The extent to which this atteinpted reinterpretation has falsified the accounts of the philosophy of Anaxagoras is little appreciated. Inasmuch s the chief points in question bear directly on the problem now under consideration, we may turn at once to discuss them.
The thought of Anaxagoras would seem to be sufficiently clear and intelligible. He endeavored to answer two main questionsnamely, that which relates to the One and the Many, and that which relates to change and differentiation. The One he found in a universal state of mixture; the Many, in an infinity of elemental notion "number", s Plato's μέγα και σμικρόν meantsubstances absolutoly homogeneoua, uoalterable, and infinitely divisible. In the primordiai πάντα ομού these δμοιομερη were s absolutely defined s they are in the world about us. Thus far we have a systom liko that of Empedocles, except that the latter postulated four elements, \vhero the ibrmer posited an infinity. The iirst iinportant difference between the Systems is that, whereas Empedocles assuined a penodic oscillation between σογκρισις and διάκριση, Anaxagoras conceived of only one segregation of like to like, and that iucomplete, resulting not in an absolute Separation of the several kinds of ομοιομερη, but only in a condition in which the like elements gained the ascendency in particular things. This predominance of one element, accompanied by an admixture of every other element, constitutes the individuality of a thing. Change, on the other band, consists in a recomposition of such sort that another element, or group of elements, comes to predominate in a given compound.
Aristotle was not content to leave the matter thus. He suggested that Anaxagoras must have meant, or at any rate ought to have said, that the condition in the state of universal mixture was that of the absence of all quality.
109 ) This Interpretation was taken up and treated more seriously than it deserved by Theophrastus, 110 ) whose application of the same notion to Anaximander we have already noticed, although he well knew 111 ) that Anaxagoras had not so expressed himself. Assuming the correctness of Aristotle's Interpretation, we should of course have a clear case of K*) Met. 989 a 30 foll.
110
) See Diels, Dox. 479, 12 foll. 1U ) Aet. I. 24,2 Εμπεδοκλής Αναξαγόρας Δημόκριτος Επίκουρος καΐ πάντες συναθροισμόν των λεπτομερών σωμάτων κοσμοποιουσι συγκρίσεις μεν και δια-κρίσεις είσάγου3ΐ$ γενέσεις δε καΐ φθοράς ου κυρίως· οί> γαρ κατά το ποιόν εξ αλλοι-ώσεως, κατά δε το ποσόν εκ συναθροισμοϋ ταύτας γίνεσθαι. Cp. also Anaxagoras fr. 17 το δε γίνεσθαι καΐ άπο'λλυσθαι ο6κ ορθώς νομίζουσιν οί Έλληνες· ουδέν γαρ χρήμα γίνεται ουδέ απο'λλυται, αλλ' από έόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεταί τε και διακρίνεται. The doxographic account, which is correct in every detail, rests on the authority of Theophrastus, Epicurus having been subsequently added s the epigonus of Democritus. This case of manifest contradiction in Theophrastus has not received the attention that it deserves because it throws light on the relation of bis reports to those of Aristotle. άλλοίωσις in the differentiation of qualitatively defined elenients from the qualitatively indifferent One. We have repeatedly observed the fascination exercised by this notion upon the Imagination of Aristotle and his successors, and we have corae to be justiiiably suspicious of their findings in such a case s this. Nobody will gainsay our right to call in question Aristotle's Statement when he asserts that this represents the view of Anaxagoras.
112 ) There is another point at which our authorities profess to find in Anaxogoras the doctrine of άλλοίωαις. It has to do with the psychology of perception by opposites. We have already touched upon this matter in speaking of Heraclitus, and may therefore treat it here more briefly than we should otherwise do. Theophrastus attributes to Anaxagoras the view that interaction occurs only between dissimilars.
113 ) This Statement, I think, can readily 112 ) Phys. 187 a 29 δια τούτο γαρ ούτω λέγουσιν, ην ομού τα πάντα και το γίνεαθαί τοιονδε καθέστηκεν άλλοιουσδαι. The last clause might be taken s a quotation, but Prantl rightly renders it ''und das Entstehen eines qualitativ bestimmten Dinges ist dann nur eine qualitative Aenderung". De Gen. et Corr. 314 a 11 όσοι δε πλείω την δλην ενός τιθέασιν οίον Εμπεδοκλής και ^Αναξαγόρας και Λεύκιππος, τούτοις δε έτερον (sc. άλλοίωσιν και γένεσιν ανάγκη ειπείν), καί-τοι Αναξαγόρας γε την οίκείαν φωνήν ήγνόηαεν λέγει γοϋν ως το γίνεσθαι και άπόλλυσθαι ταύτόν καθέστηκε τψ άλλοιουσ&αι. Zeller L 979, 3 regards the last clause s a direct quotation frorn Anaxagoras. Diels rightly decides otherwise. I incline to think Anaxagoras used the verb άλλοιουσθαι, though in the vague sense 'of change of character, the mode being defined s σύγκριαις and διάκρισις, s in [Hippocr.] de Victu> quoted above nn. 63 and 79. Aristotle was prooe to take the \vords έτεροιοϋσθαι and άλλοιοΰσθαι in his own sense. About the clause καίτοι . . . ήγνόησεν there is much doubt. Prantl renders thus: "Und doch hat A. sein eigenes Wort mi kannt; er sagt ja wenigstens, da das Entstehen und Vergehen das N mliche sei, wie das qualitative Ge ndertwerden.' 1 Professor Shorey, in a private communication, suggests that "Aristotle means that 9 Anaxagoras failed to recognize what are (according to Aristotle) the necessary nplications of his own doctrine. The expression is figurative and, I think, proverbial". The Berlin Aristotle renders "quamquani Anax. suam profecto vocem ignoravit". BonitZj in the Index, says "Non recte intellexit propriam vocabuli α>λοιουσθαι vira". It seems s if Aristotle must be charging Anaxagoras with not understanding his own words for having involved himself in a contradiction. This is suggested by καίτοι . . . γουν. Cp. the contradiction Aristotle finds in Empedocles n. 105 above. See also n. 123, below. and n. 28, above. m ) Theophr. de Sensu^ quoted above, n. 67. Ibid. 27 έραν μεν γαρ ττζ έα^άσει της κόρης, ουκ έαφαίνεαβαι δε είς το όμόχρων, αλλ* εις το διάφορον . . . be shown to be falso, and the occasion for the misapprehension is so obvious that onc who is attentive cannot fall to discover it.
Theophrastus would clearly havc us believe that Anaxogoras accepted the principle of interaction between dissimilars and rejected that of interaction between similars. This can be shown to be an error. In the first place there appears to be no satisfactory explanation for Anaxagoras's assumption of a universal mixture except on the theory that, s like only can act on like, euch thing, in order to admit of interaction with others, must contain an element or elements common to them. This principle, in its most generalized form, was distinctly enuntiated by Diogenes and the Atomists, and was satisfied in their Systems by making all substance in essence identical. Empedocles and Anaxagoras, postulating a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements, had recourse to the device of a universal mixture. The principle δμοιον ομού» thus lies at the base of all these Systems.
This can be shown for Anaxagoras s clearly s possible in at least one form of interaction, namely that of nutrition, 114 ) a TYJV δε χρόαν την κρατούσαν μάλλον εις την έτέραν έμφαίνεσθαι. 28 τον αυτόν δε τρόπον και την «φήν και την γευσιν κρίνειν το γαρ ομοίως θερμόν και ψυχρόν ούτε θερμαίνειν ούτε ψόχειν πλησιάζον ουδέ δη το γλυκύ και το όξυ * οι αυτών γνωρίζειν, άλλα τω μεν θερμιυ το ψυχρόν, τφ δ 5 άλμυρψ το πότιμον, τψ ff όξει το γλυκί) κατά την ελλειψιν την έκαστου ... 29 άπασαν δ' αίσθησιν μετά λύπης, όπερ αν δόςειεν ακόλουθον είναι τί| υποθέσει* παν γαρ το άνόμοιον άπτόμενον πόνον παρέχει. Cp. Aet. IV. 9, 16 Αναξαγόρας πασαν αισθησιν μετά τιόνου. That these Statements prove nothing is shown by a reference to de Sensu 9 for Empedocles and ibid. 42 for Diogenes. m ) Fr. 10 πώς γαρ ά'ν, φησίν, εκ μη τριχός γένοιτο θριξ και σαρξ εκ μη σαρκός; See Arist. Phys. 203 a 19 fall, and Simplic. ad loc. όρων ουν -παν εκ παντός γινόμενον . . . και τροφής δε της αυτής προσφερόμενης οίον ά'ρτου πολλά και ανόμοια γίνεται, σάρκες οστά φλέβες νεύρα τρίχες, όνυχες και πτερά δε εί οδτω τυχοι και κέρατα, (αυξεται δε το ό'μοιον τω δμοι'ο^· διό ταύτα εν τί] τροφτ) υπέλαβεν είναι καΐ εν τ^Τ υδατι,' εί τούτψ τρέφοιτο τα δένδρα, ξυλον και φ?νθΐόν και καρπόν. διό πάντα εν πασιν έλεγε μεμίχθαι και την γένεσιν κατά εκκρισιν γίνεσ&χι. προς τοΰτο δε ένηγεν ίσως και το μενόντων τινών γίνεσθαι απ αυτών άλλα ώσπερ εκ λίθου πυρ και εξ ύδατος πομφολυγίζοντος αέρα. ορών ουν αφ' εκάστου των νυν διακεκριμένων πάντα έκκρινόμενα οίον από ά'ρτου σάρκα και όστουν και τα ά'λλα, ως πάντων άμα ένυπαρχόντων αύτψ και μεμιγμένων ομού, εκ τούτων όπενόει και πάντα ομού τα οντά μεμιχθαι πρότερον πριν διακρι&ηναι.
form in which interaction was recognized from the dawo of Greek philosophy. But it is likewise involved and clearly implied in the doctrine of the Νους. Why, in the System of Anaxagoras, is the Νους unmixed and pure? In order to be free from interaction or inflnence on the part of the woiid,
115
) which conld not be avoided if it contained anything eise in its own nature, since like act on like. The Νους of Anaxagoras is the prototype of Aristotle's God, who is required by the theory to touch the world without being touched in return. Evidently the assumption is that if the Νους had something in common with the world, it could not he purely active, but must be passive also. Of course Anaxagoras was inconsistent: but was Aristotle less so?
How then are we to explain this Singular misrepresentation of the thought of Anaxagoras? The case is exactly the same s that of Heraclitus.
116 ) Theophrastus, with the inveterate Peripatetic prejudice, thinks to find αλλοίωσις wherever there are contrarieties involved in any fashion in the production of something new. m )
) Cp. Plato, Grat. 413C; Arist., de Anima 405* 15 foll., 429* 18 foll.; P/ys. 256 b 24 foll.; Gen. et Corr. 328a 18 foll., and Met. book XL Fortunately Λνβ are here in position to present Anaxagoras's ipsissima verba tr. 12 τα μεν άλλα τταντός μοΐραν μετέχει, νους δε εστίν άπειρον και αύτοκρατές και μέμεικται ούδενί γρήματι, αλλά μονός αυτός εφ* εαυτού εστίν. ε{ μη γαρ εφ* εαυτού ην, αλλά τεω έμέμεικτο άλλιρ, μετει/εν αν απάντων χρημάτων, εί έμέμεικτό τεψ . . . και αν έκώλυον αυτόν τα συμμεμειγμένα, ώστε μηδενός χρήματος κρατεΐν ομοίως ως και μόνον έοντα εφ* εαυτού . . . και τα συμμισγόμενά τε και άποκρινόμενα και οιακρινόμενα πάντα εγνω νους. This last clause naturally makes difficulty. Just s one cannot understand how the Νους (and Aristotle's God) can act on the world without being reacted on, no matter what the principle, whether that of δμοιον όμοίω or any other; so one naturally wonders how, on the principle ομοιον όμοιοι, the Νους, being unmixed, can know the mixed. We meet the same inconsistency in Empedocles, where the principle is beyond dispute. Aristotle (de Anima 410^ 5 foll.) ridicules him for making God the most unintelligent of beings, becaiise he alone is ignorant of Strife, one of the 'eleraent^ The seems to be that Empedocles and Anaxagoras made certain concessions to the point Of view of the popul r religion. lj ) See above, nn. 76-78. n7 ) This is well shown in regard to nutrition by Arist., Phys. 260^ 29, quoted above, n. 9. See also Theophr., de Sensu 31 το μεν ούν τοϊς έναντίοις ττοιείν την αισ&ησιν Ιχει τινά λίγον, ώσπερ ελέχθη * δοκει γαρ ή αλλοίωσις ούχ υπό των ομοίων αλλά '^ο των εναντίων είναι κτλ. According to Aristotle sense-Wo raay therefore dismiss Anaxagoras with the confident assertioa that bis doctrine of psycbological contrast had no connection with such qualitative change.
Tho Atomists propounded a doctrine which, in its general outlines, is reraarkably clear. It is unnecessary to restate the theory in detail. The concrete world consists of atoms and void. Interaction between atoms is by impact, and rests on the fundamental principle that only like can act on like:
118 ) hence all atoms are essentially homogeneous, differing only in size and shape and (in composition) in position. The differences in the world, we should therefore expect, would be essentially confined to composite things.
Here, however, we meet the important fact that the Atomists, after starting with a purely physical conception of the atom, fall back upon what we may properly call the chemical view, to explain the infinite variety in the universe.
119
) Hence, while we should have expected them t o rely wholly on position and arrangement of the atoms in the compounds, they made much of the presence or absence of atoms of specific charaoters. It matters little that these specific characters were regarded s ultimately difFerences of mass: the effect was the same s if the differences -perception is a πά&ος, and hence of course the result of interaction between the unlike, and hence άλλοίωσις. See also below, n. 127 on Demoeritus. 118 ) Arist, de Gen. et Corr. 323h H φησί γαρ το αί>τό και δμοιον είναι το τε ποιούν και το πάσχον ου γαρ έγχωρεΐν τα ετέρα και διαφέροντα πάσχειν ότί αλλήλων, άλλα καν ετέρα οντά ποιί) τι είς άλληλα, οβχ -jj ετέρα άλλ ? ή ταύτόν τι ύπα'ρχει, ταύτη τούτο συμβαίνειν αοτοϊς. This one passage will suffice: on this point all authorities agree.
. . · 119 ) Arist., de Gen. et Corr. 314& 21 εκ σωμάτων αδιαιρέτων ταλλα συγκεϊσθαί φασι, ταύτα δ"*^ άπειρα και το πλήθος είναι και τάς (Λορφάς, αυτά (the compounds) δε προς αυτά διαφέρειν τούτοις εξ ων είσι (ι. e.^ in point of the constituting atoms) και θέσει και τάξει τούτων. The importance of the specific ingredients is emphasized in.many ways, notably in connection with that refinement of the notion of a general mixture known s the theory of the pores and effluences. Cp. de .Gen. et Corr. 315 h 13 (quoted below, n. 122) and Liieret. I. 677, 800, 814 913; II. 581. It is interesting to note that modern chemistry is. contrariwise in certain cases, notably in regard to phenomena of isomerism, falling back on purely physical notions, such s position and arrangement. had been of another kind.
12°) 1t was no doubt the Intention of Democritus to strip the atoms of. all special qualities; 121 ) but the traditional view had its revenge, since he left certain atoms so constituted that in and of themselves they must produce specific results, just s if they possessed the qualities in qnestion.
322 )
The mediate result of this doctrine was the formal distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 1 * 3 ) This distinction Aristotle quite naturally equated with that between essential and accidental qualities, although the distinctions were by no means coincident. The former was the product of a train of thought having in view the physical definition of a thing in terms of mass; the latter resulted froin the Socratic dialectic, ending in a logical definition per yenus et differentiam speci cam. It was the confusion of these two sets of notions, l believe, that led Aristotle to assert that Leucippus definitely recognized άλλοιωσις in a sense so like his own that he evidently mistook one for the other. m )
12°) Hence some of the historical problems touching Atomisin cannot be solved. There were manifest inconsistencies in the handling of this notion of specific differences: cp. Theophr., de Sensu 68. There was also inuch uncertainty ia regard to the occasions on which reccmrse was had to this principle of differentiation: cp. Theophr., de Odor. 64. u>1 ) The atoms are repeatedly spoken of s άποιοι; cp. fr. 117.
122
) Democritus, to be sure, attributed these qualitative effects in part to our' sense-organs, thus making the qualities subjective; but he also explained the relativity of qualities to the percipient by the mixture in the compounds, thus making the qualities really objective, cp. Theophr. de Sensu 67, and see n. 122. This same point of view is implied in giving specific shapes to certain atoms, upon which the possibility of such compounds really depends» 123 ) This distinction was not definitely stated by the Atomists: it is only an inference from such Statements s that in fr. 117. Nevertheless it is only natural to recognize it s in principle involved in the system, although the many inconsistencies witb which Democritus is charged by our authorities detract from its significance for his philosopby.
324
) De Gen. et Corr. 315b l ποιήσαντες τα σχήματα τψ άλλοίωσιν και τ//ν γέ^εσιν l·/, τούτων ττοιουσι, διακρισει μεν και συγκρίσει (by composition and decomposition) γένεσιν και φθορών, τάξει οέ καΐ θέσει άλλοίίοσιν. This categorical assertion would seem to be decisive; but there is nothing to support it, and everything eise contradicts it. In fact Aristotles's own words, wbich immediately follow, disprove the inference which one might think to draw from this utterance: έττεί <? ιυοντο τάληβές εν τψ φαίνεσΟαι, εναντία δε και άπειρα τα Aristotle, to be eure, was predisposed to find άλλοίωσις in the Atoinists s in the other pre-Socratics. Their fundamental principle of the homogeneity of all things was enough to jostify this conclusion to his mind. m ) But Aristotle Stands convicted of error out of bis own mouth. The most that can be said for his position is that Democritus, inconsistent in this s in other details, sometimes attributed a change to differences of position and arrangement without specifically mentioning the factor of recomposition. But he did not recognize a real distinction between the two cases, such s Aristotle suggests in marking off γενεσις and φθορά from άλλοίωσις. It remains for us to consider the question s it relates to tbe Atomist's theory of sense-perception. Theophrastus begins his account by saying that Democritus did not declare himself on the point, whether perception was due to interaction between similars or dissimilars.
126 ) So much we may accept s beyond question.
Theophrastus, however, is not content to let the matter rest there. After considering the problein from many points of view, he appears to reach the conclusion that Democritus on the whole inclined more φαινόμενα, τα σχήματα άπειρα εποίησαν, ώστε ταΐς μεταβολαΐς του συγκειμένου (by changes in composition) το αυτό εναντίον δοκεΐν άλλφ καΐ άλλω, και μετακινεΐσοαι (evidently the Atomist's own expression, for which Aristotle would substitute αλλοιοϋσοαι) μικρού έμμειγνομένου καΐ όλως έτερον φαίνεσθαι ενός μετακινη-θέντος* εκ των αυτών γαρ τραγιρδία και κωμφδία γίνεται γραμμάτων (but not in the same proportions etc.). Cp. also n. 117. The doctrine of relativity is explained here just s it is (see above, n. 120) by Theophr. ) De Gen. ei Corr. 314h l τοις μεν ουν εξ ενός πάντα κατασκευάζουσιν άναγκαΐον λέγειν και την φθοράν άλλοίωσιν. Arist., fr. 208 (Rose) ει τοίνυν ή μεν γενεσις συγκρισις των ατόμων εστίν, ή δε φ&ορά διάκρισις, και κατά Δημόκριτον άλλοίωσις αν είη ή γενεσις. This latter passage is to be compared with those on Empedocles and Anaxagoras, nn. 105 and 110.
186
) De Sensu 49 Δ. δε περί μ-iv αίσ&ήσεως ου διορίζει, πάτερα τοις έναντίοις ή τοις όμοίοις ,..72 ώστε καΐ κατά·, το ϋποκείμενον έ'δει διορίζειν, τ:ο'τερον εξ ομοίων ή εξ ανόμοιων εστί, και πώς ή των αισθήσεων άλλοίωσις γίνεται.
to the assumption of perception by opposites or dissimilars. m ) In this discussion we find reappearing the same arguments that we met in connection with Heraclitus and Anaxagoras; but the Peripatetic prejudices and presuppositions are here so undisguished that one readily discerns that there was no sufficient reason, at least on the score of his doctrine of sense-perception, for imputing άλλοίωσις to Democritus. Democritus appears to have said, in words which we cannot ex'actly determine, that perception was an affection of the senseorgans, his desire being to assert the subjectivity and relativity of sense.
12δ ) Το an Aristotelian this thought at once suggested the word παβος 159 ) to characterize sense, and this term inevitably associated itself in turn with διάβεσις 130 ) and πάσχειν.
m ) The former of these words was connected with the ancient observation 132 ) that perception and the 'frame of mind 7 dopend on the condition of the individual. From the timo of Parmenides this notion took on the form of an assumed difference in the proportions existing between the olementary constituents of man. Theophrastus elsewhere infers from this conception that the thinkers in question 127 ) This will be evident to one who reads attentively the whole passage 49-83.
12S
) See above, n. 120.
129
) Cp. the frequent use of πά&η, s. e. g. 60 Δ. δε πάντα πά$η της αίσΟήσεως ποιών (cp. 61), 63 πάντα πάθη της αίσ&ήσεως άλλοιουμένης, etc.
13°) 64 έτι ο 5 αυτούς μεταβάλλειν τ^ κρήσει κατά τα πάθη και τάς ηλικίας· ΎΙ και φανερόν ώ; ή διάθεσις αιτία της φαντασίας. -58 περί δε του φρονειν επί τοσούτον είρηκεν δτι γίνεται συμμέτρως έχούσης της ψυχής κατά την κρησιν. εάν δε περιθερμο'ς τις ή περίψυχρος γένηται, μεταβάλλειν φησί. δι* δ τι και τους παλαιούς καλώς τουίΓ ΰπολ<ίβεϊν δτι εστίν άλλόφρονειν (cp. Arist,, de Anima 404^ 30). ώστε φανερόν, δτι ττ} κράσει του σώματος ποιεί το φρονειν. This doctrine of κρασις was clearly borrowed from Parmenides and EmpedocJes, and is to be interpreted accordingly.
131
) 49 ει μεν γαρ (τψ) άλλοιουσθαι ποιεί το αίσθάνεσθαι, δόξειεν αν τοις διαφοροις· ου γαρ άλλοιοΰται το ομοιον οπό του ομοίου* πάλιν δ' (ει) το μεν αίσΟάνεσδαι και απλώς άλλοιοϋσ&αι (τψ) πάσχειν κτλ.
132
) Theopbr., jie Sensu 72 αλλά περί μεν τούτων εοικε συνηκολουΟηκέναι τοίς ποιουσιν όλως το φρονειν κατά την άλλοίωσιν, ηπερ εστίν αρχαιότατη δόξα. πάντες γαρ οι παλαιοί και ποιηταΐ και σοφοί κατά την διά&εσιν άποδιδόασι το φρονεϊν.
accepted the dictum ομοιον όμοιψ. m ) In this instance he unaccountably concluded to the opposite principle. And s for πάαχειν, the term invariably suggested to the Aristotelian interaction between dissinnlars or opposites, which is what Aristotle called άλλοίωσις. The chain of associated ideas is thus complete, and Theophrastus unhesitatingly accepted the conclusion that Democritus held the doctrine. In this he was confirmed by the psychological principle of contrasts, 134 ) in relation to perception and images: but we ha\ 7 e come to know that this notion had nothing to do with the problem.
We saw above that Democritus did not expressly state whether or not his theory of perception presupposed the interaction of like with like and that Theophrastus on the whole inclined to think he proceeded on the opposite view. This conclusion I regard s wholly without justification. The reason why Democritus did not expressly declare himself on this question was siinply that there was no need of it. There was only one view at that time current; namely that all interaction took place between similars, and Democritus had himself stated this principle 135 ) unequivocally and COIDLprehensively, and his entire theory of perception proceeds upon it. One needs only to be reminded that vision results from effluences in the form of images similar to the objects that give them off.
136 ) This theory of effluences and pores was borrowed from Empedocles. The contrary has been asserted/ 37 ) but it is to me inconceivable 133 ) Cp. de Sensu l and 3.
134
) Cp. άλλοχρως ibid. 50 and 54, and see n. 113 above. We have repeatedly shown that this principle did not conflict with the dictum ομοιον όμοι'ω.
135
) See above, n. 118.
336
) Theephr., de Sensu 50 όμοσχημονεϊν τοϊς ,άποτυπουμένοις. Cp. Usener, Epicurea p. 220, 25.
137
) Diels, Ueber Leukipp und Demokrit, in Verb, der 35. Versamml. deutscher Philologen etc., Stettin, 1880, p. 104, n. 28; and Zeller, Zu Leucippus, Archiv ffir Gesch. der Philos., XV., 137 foll. Diels lays stress on the point that the theory of pores is absurd on the assμmption of a plenum such s Empedocles posited, whereas it has meaning on the Atomic assumption of a void. But this is not so certain. The assumption of a void and the postulate that all interaction is by impact render absurd the System of that the theory should have originated with a pbilosopher who, like Leucippus, believed that all matter was homogeneous. The theory of \i(fa, with its corollaries, the homogeneous effluences and pores, and atoms of speciiic shapes and consequently of speci c characters 5 is an incongruous survival in Atomism from the philosophies of Parmenides and Empedocles. And from these philosophies comes with the doctrines in question the implication of interaction between similars. Theophrastus himself had a lurking sense that Dernocritus's theory of Sensation involved the principle οποίον όμοίω, 138 ) thus yielding the last defense of άλλοίωσις.
We come now to Diogenes of Apolloma, the latest philosopher whom we shall study in detail. Diogenes-himself has rauch to say of έτεροίωσις 139 ) and Simplicius cannot help marvelling 14°) that while he regards all particular things s modifications (έτεροιώσεις) of air, he inaintains the eternity and immortality of the element, only the variations arising and passing away. Bis surprise is in no small degree due to his Peripatetic preconceptions; for, with Aristotle, Simplicius doubtless understood έτεροίωσις s άλλοίωσις. Diogenes however distinctly taught that the diiferentiations of the special ef uences fittiny into speci c pores. Ho wabsurd tbis assumption becomes may be seen in Epicurus, Epist. ad Eerod. 47 89εν και τα'χη ανυπέρβλητα έχει (sc. τα είδωλα), ττάντα -πόρον σύμμετρον έχοντα. This is not the place to argue the question at length; but this consideration seems decisive.
13δ
) See the discussion De Sensu 49, and in 50 τα γαρ ομόφυλα μάλιστα εκαατον γνωρίζει. Yet Sext. Empir. VII. 117 αλλ' 6 μεν Δ. επί τε των έμψυχων και αψύχων ϊστησι τον λ<5γον κτλ. seems to suggest that Democritus, contrary to the doctrine of Plato, limited it to animals and things inaniinate, excluding man.
13S
) See fr. 2 and 5. uo ) Simplic., Phys. 153, 17 θαυμαστον δε ότι, κατά έτεροίωσιν την άτι* αυτού (sc. αέρος) λέγων τα Αλά γίνεσθαι, άίδιον όμως α6τό φησι λέγων (fr. 8)· ς κα! α6τό μεν τούτο καΐ άίδιον και άοανατον σώμα, τψ δε τα μεν γίνεται, τα δε απολείττει'. All this proeeeds on the principle, emphatically affirmed in fr. 2, tbat in order that there may be interaction the world must be in substance one, s only like reacts on like. Tbeophrastus does not attribute to Diogenes interaction of dissimilars (see de Sensu 39), though the function of contrast in perception is referred to (iotrf. 42)» The dependence of Diogenes on Empedocles appears in his use of συμμετρία (ibid. 41 and 42), which probably involved the theory of pores and effluents.
Archiv f r Geschichte der Philosophie. XIX. 3. 25 olemental air wore mere chaoges in extension and mass, effected by rarefaction aud condensation. m ) It is reported, to be sure, that this involved qualitative change, and the terms are those of the traditional aXXoiWic; 141 ) but we must bear in mind that Theophrastus was thoronghly imbued with the spirit of Aristotle, who, s we know, scented this conception wherever there was a monistic System and wherever recourse was had to rarefaction and condensation.
We thus meet once more the System of Anaximenes with certain important points of difference. The most significant difference is this, that whereas Anaximenes had not expressly declared the un y of the elemental substance, Diogenes s the epigone feit constrained to do so. Interpreting this declaration, s he was prone to do, s involving the Eleatic notion of absolute unity and homogeneity, Aristotle could conceive of difference within it only s arising by qualitative change. But Diogenes did not so understand unity, asserting that it included 1 **) difference. Again, Anaximenes had made some concession to popul r ideas in recognizing the maxima mundi membra s in some degree characteristic stages of existence. This is not at all surprising since even the Atomists and Epicurus, with far less theoretical justi-U1 ) Laert Diog. IX. 57. This is due to κίνησις άίδιος, s with Anaximenes; cp. Strom. 12, Dox. 583, 2 foll.
142
) Simplic., Phys. 25, Dox. 477, 8 την του παντός φυσιν αέρα ... εξ ου πυκνουμένου χαΐ .μανουμένου καΐ μεταβάλλοντος τοις πάθεσι την των άλλων γίνεσθαι μορφήν. Zeller L 264 speaks of 'qualitative Ver nderung' on the strength of this passage. Diogenes himself (fr. 4) says εστί γαρ πολύτροπος (sc. δ αήρ; naturally the Peripatetics say εύαλλοίωτος), και θερμότερος και ψυχρότερος και ξηρότερος και Υγρότερος καΐ στασιμώτερος καΐ όξυτέρην κίνησιν Ιχων, κα\ άλλαι πολλά! έτεροιώσιες ενεισιν και ηδονής καΐ χροιής άπειροι. The word πολύτροπες, here means 'varied' implying not change but difference. The cold and the bot are of course synonymous with the dense and the rare; the dry and the wet (earth and water, for example) are likewise,. and the stationary and the moving are also to the mind of Diogenes inseparably connected with the same. There remain tastes (or odors?) and colors. How did he conceive of them? Certainly he thought of each s determined by its specific constitution, though it is not clear whether he posited mixed ingredients or stated all differences immediately in terms of rare and dense.
143
) See ένεισι in the preceding note. Cp. n. 34. fication, did the same. Diogenes apparently did not so; for he seems to have combatted the notion of the four Elements'. 1 * 4 ) He asserts that no two beiogs are wholly alike, each occupying a place apart in the graduated scale of tenuity and density, 145 ) seeing that if they were wholly alike they would be identical. Here then we find in a rather striking doctrine the logical consequence of the Eleatic identification of the εν and the ομοιον. Yet Diogenes appears to have been somewhat inconsistent in his theory of perception; for, according to Theophr % astus, de Sensu 39 folL, he recognized the principle of mixture in the constitntion of man s aftecting sense. This doctrine presupposes aggregates of somewhat stable and determinate character, sufficiently unlike to make it necessary to bridge the chasm between them, on the principle ομοιον όμούρ, by a mixture that would bring theni together. Thus Diogenes has his affinities also with the μίξΐζ-doctrines of Empedocles and Anaxagoras; but there is no proof of άλλοίωσις in the sense of Aristotle.
